From Westphalia to Syria — the Primacy of Nation States in the Liberal International Order
The history of the world is often told as one of empires: Chinese dynasties, the Mongols, the Aztecs, the Persians.
Conversely, since the end of the Roman Empire in 476 A.D., the history of Europe can only be told as one of failed empires. Charlemagne’s didn’t last, nor did Napoleon’s, nor any other. Even the world’s greatest empire, the British, strangely didn’t even try to conquer the European continent. That difference to what happened elsewhere in the world became the organizing principle of today’s liberal international order, and remains its greatest burden: the power of nation states.
European kingdoms or states have historically proved to have close to equal strength. After the catastrophe of the Thirty-Year War, they accepted this reality: first in 1648 with the establishment of the Westphalian System, and then in 1815, as a consequence of the catastrophes of the Napoleonic wars, with the development of the balance of power concept at the Congress of Vienna. This created an international order based on the assumption of equal rights of all nations, a notion spread throughout the world via colonialism and imperialism in the 19th century.
It was only as global capitalism developed over the course of the 19th century that “liberal“ characteristics entered the global order.
However, that order was not yet a liberal one. It was only as global capitalism developed over the course of the 19th century that “liberal“ characteristics entered the global order, which saw the free exchange of goods become a key objective. Enlightenment values, such as freedom and rights of the individual, developed in parallel. Both were based on an understanding of internationally valid legal principles.
In 1920, European countries — having suffered the catastrophes of the First World War — created the League of Nations as a first effort to establish a rules-based international order allowing free exchange and cooperation on the basis of equality, hoping this would lead to international peace. They did so without the participation of a then-isolationist United States.
The League of Nations failed. It was only in 1942, during the Second World War, that twenty-six states led by the United States and Great Britain subscribed to a “Declaration by United Nations.” The declaration set out values that are now regarded as the core of the liberal world order: “liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice.” On the basis of that declaration, fifty-one states created the United Nations in 1945. The UN charter and subsequent documents can be said to epitomize what we understand as today’s liberal international order. Even the Soviet Union, very far from being a liberal state, subscribed to the principles of that order.
On the stage of world politics however, most of Europe, the cradle of the Enlightenment, liberalism and the concept to the equality of states on a basis of law, now was marginalized: its East supporting the Soviet Union, and Western Europe supporting the United States.
A problem showed up that haunts the liberal international order today: if all states are equal, then interference in the internal affairs of another state is not allowed.
Even during the days of the League of Nations, a problem showed up that haunts the liberal international order today: if all states are equal, then interference in the internal affairs of another state is not allowed. The primacy of the nation state is the organizing principle of the United Nations. If, however, a member state’s domestic policies are in stark violation of the principles of the liberal order, is there not a moral duty for the proponents of the liberal international order to intervene?
President Donald Trump’s recent attack on a Syrian airfield — a response to a poison gas attack probably committed by the Syrian government — is a case study of the ambiguity built into our global order.
